CogPhi

Publications

2022

• Olsson, E. J. (2022). Explicationist epistemology and the explanatory role of knowledge. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 53, 41-60.
  
  

• Olsson, E. J., Tjøstheim, T. A., Stephens, A., Schwaninger, A., and Roszko, M. (2022). The cognitive basis of the conditional probability solution to the value problem for reliabilism. Acta Analytica.
  

2021

• Stephens, A., Tjøstheim, T. A., Roszko, M., & Olsson, E. J. (2021). A dynamical perspective on the generality problem. Acta Analytica, 36(3), 409-422. 
  
  

• Tjøstheim, T. A. & Stephens, A. (2021). Intelligence as accurate prediction. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 13, 475–499.

2020

• Felix, C. V. & Stephens, A. (2020). A naturalistic perspective on knowledge how: Grasping truths in a practical way. Philosophies, 5(1), 5. Reprinted in Philosophies Special Issue, M. J. Schroeder, & G. Dodig-Crnkovic (Eds.), Contemporary natural philosophy and philosophies—Part 2. Basel: MDPI.
  
  
• Stephens, A., & Felix, C. V. (2020). A cognitive perspective on knowledge how: Why intellectualism is neuro-psychologically implausible. Philosophies, 5(3), 21. Reprinted in Philosophies Special Issue, M. J. Schroeder, & G. Dodig-Crnkovic (Eds.), Contemporary natural philosophy and philosophies—Part 2. Basel: MDPI.
  
  
• Stephens, A. & Tjøstheim, T. A. (2020). The cognitive philosophy of reflection. Erkenntnis, 87, 2219-2242.
  
  
• Tjøstheim, T. A., Stephens, A., Anikin, A., & Schwaninger, A. (2020). The cognitive philosophy of communication. Philosophies, 5(4), 39. Reprinted in Philosophies Special Issue, G. Dodig-Crnkovic, & M. J. Schroeder (Eds.), Contemporary natural philosophy and Philosophies—Part 3 Basel: MDPI.

2019

• Stephens, A. (2019). Three levels of naturalistic knowledge. In M. Kaipainen, F. Zenker, A. Hautamäki, & P. Gärdenfors (Eds.), Conceptual spaces: Elaborations and applications (Synthese library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 405, pp. 57-73). (PsyArXiv)
  
  

• Tjøstheim, T. A. & Balkenius, C. (2019). Cumulative inhibition in neural networks Cognitive Processing. 20(1), 87-102.
  
  

• Tjøstheim, T. A., Roszko, M., & Stephens, A. From a cognitive philosophical point of view. EuroCogSci 2019, Ruhr Universität Bochum, Germany. (Paper, Poster)

2018

• Balkenius, C., Tjøstheim, T. A., Johansson, B., & Gärdenfors, P. (2018). From focused thought to reveries: A memory system for a conscious robot. Frontiers in Robotics and AI, 5(29), 1-13.

• Gärdenfors, P., & Stephens, A. (2018). Induction and knowledge-what. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 8(3), 471-491.

• Roszko, M., Hall, L., Johansson, P., & Pärnamets, P. (2018). The phenomenology of eye movement intentions and their disruption in goal-directed actions. In T. Rogers, T., M. Rau, J. Zhu, & C. Kalish (Eds.), Proceedings of the 40th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 973-978). Madison: Cognitive Science Society.

2017

• Olsson, E. J. (2017) Explicationist epistemology and epistemic pluralism. In A. Coliva, & N. Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (Eds.), Epistemic pluralism (pp. 23-46 ). Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. (LU Publications)

2016

• Bååth, R., Tjøstheim, T. A., & Lingonblad, M. (2016). The role of executive control in rhythmic timing at different tempi. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23(6), 1954-1960.
  
  

• Olsson, E. J. (2016). A naturalistic approach to the generality problem. In B. P. McLaughlin, & H. Kornblith (Eds.), Goldman and his critics (pp. 178-196). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (LU Publications)
  
  

• Stephens, A. (2016). A pluralist account of knowledge as a natural kind. Philosophia, 44(3), 885-903. (PsyArXiv)